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Abstract
We develop a conceptual framework that allows simultaneously for (i) voluntary
registration for VAT by rms below the registration threshold; and (ii) bunching at
the registration threshold. This framework also generates predictions about how vol-
untary registration and bunching are related to intensity of input use, the share of
B2C transactions for a rm, opportunities for evasion via under-reporting of sales, and
the competitiveness of the market in which the rm is located. We bring the theory
to the data, using linked administrative VAT and corporation tax records in the UK
from 2004-2009. Consistently with the theory, we nd that voluntary registration is
positively related to the intensity of input use and negatively to the share of B2C
transactions, and the amount of bunching is related to these variables in the opposite
way. There is some evidence that product market competition leads to more voluntary
registration, and less bunching. In addition, we nd some suggestive evidence that
rms are bunching by under-reporting sales.
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1 Introduction
Most countries around the world use the value-added tax (VAT) as their primary indirect
tax, and most countries that adopted the VAT have thresholds, usually based on turnover,
below which businesses do not need to register for VAT.1 As VAT rates are often quite high
(in excess of 20% in many EU countries), this creates a large and salient tax notch for small
businesses whose turnover is around the threshold.2 So far, the e¤ect of these VAT notches
on rm behavior has not received much attention.
In this paper, we make several contributions on this front, both theoretically, and em-
pirically, using administrative data on UK corporations. First, what are the stylized facts
to be explained? One striking feature of our data is that over the time period 2004-2009,
approximately 44% of rms with turnover below the threshold were registered for VAT. It
seems unlikely that this is entirely due to inertia - and indeed we present evidence below
to show that this is not the case - and so we conclude that some rms actively choose to
register, even if they are below the threshold. This is a striking phenomenon which deserves
further study; to our knowledge, voluntary payment of any tax is very rare.
Also, in our UK administrative data, there is strong evidence that some rms are re-
stricting their turnover to stay just below the registration threshold, i.e. they bunch. Apart
from intrinsic interest, these features are also important because they impact on production
ine¢ ciencies induced by the VAT; when rms do not register, they face so-called embedded
VAT on inputs, which distorts input choices, and also cascades through the production chain
(?).
Our rst contribution is to develop a simple general equilibrium model that can explain
both these phenomena in a unied way. Our rst observation is that the coexistence of both
voluntary registration and bunching requires that rms make both sales to nal consumers
(B2C sales) and sales to other VAT-registered businesses (B2B sales). To see this, suppose
rst that rms make only B2C sales. Then, it is easily shown that irrespective of the degree
of competition between rms, the cost of voluntarily registering exceeds the benet, because
the burden of VAT paid on output when registered exceeds the burden of VAT paid on inputs
when not registered. Conversely, with only B2B sales, the voluntary registration is always
optimal, because the burden of output VAT can be passed on to the buyer.3
Our second assumption is that rms have some market power, for reasons explained
1In the EU, all but two countries (Spain and Sweden) currently have positive thresholds, with the UK
threshold being the largest at £ 81,000. The thresholds in the EU are generally low compared with those in
countries that have more recently introduced a VAT, such as Singapore, which currently has a threshold of
about 540,000 Euro (http://www.vatlive.com).
2A notch arises when the tax liability changes discontinuously.
3Both these points are made formally below.
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in detail below. Finally, to study the e¤ect of input costs on voluntary registration and
bunching, we must of course also assume that small rms use intermediate inputs as well
as labour in varying proportions. So, we construct the simplest general equilibrium model
that has the required features. The model can also be extended to allow for VAT evasion
via concealment of some fraction of B2C sales.
In this setting, we show the following. First, under some assumptions, the e¤ect of the
VAT system on the registration decision can be captured by a VAT su¢ cient statistic, which
combines the e¤ects of both input and output VAT. We then show that voluntary registration
by a rm is more likely when either (i) the cost of inputs relative to sales is high, or (ii)
when the proportion of B2C sales by the rm is low.4 The intuition for (ii) is simply that if
most customers are VAT-registered, the burden of an increase in VAT can easily be passed
on in the form of a higher price, because the customer itself can claim back the increase.
The intuition for (i) is that when input costs are important, registration allows the rm to
claim back a considerable amount of input VAT.
Second, we show that the determinants of bunching at the registration threshold are
the same as for voluntary registration, with the signs of the e¤ects reversed. Specically,
bunching is more likely when (i) the cost of inputs relative to sales is low, or (ii) when the
proportion of B2C sales is high. Third, we study the e¤ect of product market competition
on voluntary registration and bunching; the e¤ects of increased competition are generally
ambiguous, but we identify the features that make it positive or negative.
Fourth, with evasion, the qualitative results obtained so far are unchanged. We show
that opportunities for evasion will increase voluntary registration and have an ambiguous
e¤ect on bunching. The latter result is somewhat surprising, as it is usually assumed in the
empirical literature that bunching is facilitated by evasion opportunities. The explanation
here is that while concealment of sales does indeed make it easier for rms to stay below the
VAT threshold, at the same time, voluntary registration becomes more attractive, as output
VAT is less of a burden.
We then bring these predictions to an administrative data-set created by linking the
population of corporation and VAT tax records in the UK from 2004-2009. We rst show
that the pattern of voluntary registration in the data is consistent with the theory. In
particular, voluntary registration is more likely with a low share of B2C sales or a high share
4Both these characteristics clearly di¤er widely across small rms that are close to the registration
threshold. For example, a small tradesperson such as a plumber or electrician may typically have mostly
B2C sales of his services to householders, and make relatively light use of intermediate inputs. So, they
would face a low e¤ective VAT rate when not registered, but a high rate when registered. Conversely, a
small specialist engineering rm, such as a car component rm, may make mostly B2B sales with heavy use
of intermediate inputs, and so will be in the reverse position.
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of input costs. Quantitatively, the probability that a rm voluntarily registers for VAT is
increased by 5 percentage points for a one standard deviation increase in the share of B2C
sales and by 2-5 percentage points for a one standard deviation increase in the input cost
ratio. The results are robust to use of either a linear probability model or xed-e¤ects logit
model, and to the inclusion of additional rm-level control variables.
We then look at bunching. In the aggregate, there is clear evidence of bunching at
the VAT threshold. Investigating further, we nd that rms are more likely to bunch at
the threshold when either (i) the cost of inputs relative to sales is high, or (ii) when the
proportion of B2C sales is low, consistently with the theory. So, there is a clear pattern of
heterogeneity in bunching.
We also investigate the mechanisms at work in bunching. We provide some suggestive
evidence that part of bunching is driven by evasion, in the form of under-reporting of sales.
Specically, we nd that the average input cost ratio moves in parallel between the registered
and non-registered rms outside the bunching region but starts to increase substantially for
the non-registered companies just below the threshold.
Finally, in the last section, we study the dynamic movement of rms in and out of
registration status. Specically, we address the concern that voluntary registration may
not be an optimizing choice of rms, but simply a failure to deregister, once having been
above the threshold and having registered. Our empirical ndings suggest that while there
is a considerable amount of persistence in rm behavior, the decision is not entirely driven
by inertia; rms change their registration decisions in a way that is consistent with prot
maximizing behavior.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews related literature.
Section 3 develops the conceptual framework to analyze VAT bunching and voluntary regis-
tration. Section 4 derives the main empirical predictions. Section 5 provides an overview of
the VAT system in the UK and describes the data. Sections 6 and 7 present the empirical
analysis for voluntary registration and VAT bunching, respectively. Section 8 studies the
dynamic movement of rms in and out of registration status. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work contributes to several strands of literature, other than those already discussed.
First, our work relates to the literature on the e¤ect of tax and regulatory thresholds, and in
particular, the e¤ect of VAT thresholds on small business behavior. In an important paper,
? were the rst to set up a model of VAT including a threshold; they show that there will
be bunching below the threshold, and a holeabove, where rms do not locate. However,
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there are a number of di¤erences between their approach and ours.5 First, their model has
only nal consumers (i.e. only B2C sales), and so, as argued above, cannot explain voluntary
registration. Second, their main focus is on the optimal registration threshold, whereas ours
is on the coexistence and determinants of voluntary registration and bunching. ? extend the
? framework to allow for evasion, as well as avoidance, of VAT. ? use a calibrated formula
from ? to infer that for a 10 percent VAT rate, the optimal level for the threshold in the
United States is $200,000.6
There is a small empirical literature on the e¤ects of VAT thresholds. ? documents the
e¤ects of the VAT threshold in Japan, focusing on the incentives for a large rm to split by
separately incorporating. A comparison of the corporate size distributions before and after
the VAT introduction of 1989 shows a clustering of corporations just below the threshold.
Recent papers following our work document bunching of small rms at the VAT registration
threshold in Finland (?) as well as lack of bunching in response to the VAT threshold in
Armenia (?). In particular, ? provide strong evidence for Finland that bunching below the
threshold occurs, and that compliance costs can explain a major part of bunching. However,
neither of these papers studies the determinants of voluntary registration in detail, nor do
they develop a theoretical framework specic to the VAT.7
There are several reasons that compliance costs may be more important in Finland than
for our study. First, the VAT threshold in Finland is very low, at 8,500 Euro, compared
to well over 100,000 Euro in the UK over our period. Other things equal, larger rms nd
compliance less costly. Second, in the UK, all active companies are required to le company
accounts and corporation tax returns, so they already have the information required for the
VAT return, and the VAT return itself is short and simple. Finally, a simplied VAT scheme,
the Flat-Rate Scheme (FRS), was introduced in the UK in 2002 to reduce compliance costs
for small businesses; however, the FRS had a low take-up rate of around 3% among all
eligible VAT traders, and there is no bunching at the FRS threshold above which rms are
no longer eligible for FRS, suggesting that rms do not try to bunch to avoid the additional
5The main focus of their paper is to study the optimal VAT threshold, a topic beyond the scope of this
paper.
6There is also a literature on VAT and the choice of informality in developing countries (?, ?). In
particular, ? present a model where rms can choose between formal production, where they must register
for VAT, and informal production; they can also choose between buying inputs from a formal and informal
supplier. The focus of the paper is on the informality choice with an application to Brazil.
7? present formulae for the reduced form elasticity implied by observed bunching which are taken directly
from ?. However, these formulae are originally developed for a labour supply model, and care must be shown
when applying them to VAT. In particular, in an earlier version of this paper ?, we show that to apply the
Kleven-Waseem formulae directly, it must be assumed that all sales are B2C, rms are price-takers, and the
production function is xed-coe¢ cients must be assumed. Moreover, the elasticity estimated is an output
supply elasticity, taking the price of output as given, not the elasticity of the tax base, because the latter
will also be determined by the elasticity of demand.
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compliance costs of normal VAT registration (?).8
More broadly, there are a few papers on the e¤ects of other kinds of thresholds. The
most relevant is ?, who study a threshold in Spain where rms with turnover above 6 million
Euro face increased tax enforcement. ? show that rms bunch at this threshold, and that
bunching is more pronounced, the lower the fraction of B2C sales in the total for the sector.
This is of course, the reverse to what we nd. Their explanation is that if sales are mostly
to other rms, if audited, a rm will have a paper trailthat will make it relatively easy to
cross-check tax returns to detect misreported intermediate input sales. The contrast between
the results of ? and ours indicates that the purpose of the turnover threshold is crucial i.e.
whether it relates to a change in tax liability - as in our case- or enforcement of a given tax
liability, as in theirs.9
Our work also relates to the literature on tax notches (?, ?, ?, ?, and ?). In particular,
? emphasize that if individuals behave fully rationally, notches give rise to bunching below
the threshold, and holes above the threshold where maximizing agents will not locate,
and then uses bunching to estimate both the elasticity of labour supply, and the degree of
optimization frictions. As shown below, the bunching equationin this paper, which relates
the amount of bunching to the elasticity of the tax base and parameters of the tax system,
is mathematically very similar to the equation of (?). However, for reasons discussed below,
it is much more di¢ cult to back out credible elasticity estimates in the VAT case, and so we
do not attempt this in the paper.
Also, because we study evasion, our paper further relates to recent literature using special
features of tax systems to identify evasion from kinks and notches. For example, ? study
a minimum tax scheme for corporations in Pakistan which has a kink point where the real
incentive for bunching is small, but the evasion incentive is large, and they nd large bunching
around the minimum tax kink.10 However, we do not measure evasion directly, nor, given
the UK VAT system, do we have any obvious way of decomposing the total bunching e¤ect
into bunching due to evasion, and that due to a real response. Rather, we show that our
theoretical predictions are robust to evasion.
8Consistently with this, direct evidence on compliance costs for the UK put costs at around 1.5% of
turnover for rms around the registration threshold (?), which is relatively small compared to the burden of
VAT at 20%.
9It may be possible that being registered for VAT increases the probability of audit. Howoever, in our
data, this e¤ect may be attenuated by the fact that all rms, VAT-registered or not, are also companies and
thus le a corporate tax return.
10More recently, ?, again for Pakistan, shows very large responses when reforms cut the rate of income
tax to zero for the self-employed, which he interprets as being largely an evasion response.
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3 Conceptual Framework
Key Features of the Model. As described in the introduction, we aim to model the
behavior of small rms selling to both nal consumers and to businesses, where both
voluntary registration and bunching can be equilibrium outcomes. The rst point is that the
coexistence of both voluntary registration and bunching requires that the smallrms make
both B2B and B2C sales. To see this, suppose rst that rms make only B2C sales. Then,
it is easily shown that irrespective of the degree of competition between rms, the cost of
voluntarily registering exceeds the benet, because the burden of VAT paid on output when
registered exceeds the burden of VAT paid on inputs when not registered. Conversely, with
only B2B sales, the voluntary registration is always optimal, because the burden of output
VAT can be passed on to the buyer.11
Second, in order to study the e¤ect of the input cost ratio transactions on voluntary regis-
tration and bunching, we must of course also assume that the smallrms use intermediate
inputs as well as labour in varying proportions, so this must be a feature of the model.
A nal assumption is that the small rms have some market power; this is for two reasons.
First, because as explained in the not-for-publication appendix in Section B, the simplest
perfectly competitive model which allows for both B2B and B2C sales has some undesirable
features; specically, there is complete sorting,12 which is not observed in practice, and the
structure of the equilibrium is more complex than with monopolistic competition. Second,
in practice, markets are not perfectly competitive, and it is interesting to ask what the e¤ect
of the degree of competition are on voluntary registration and bunching.
So, we construct the simplest general equilibrium model that has the required features.
There is a single representative consumer that supplies labour and buys two kinds of goods; a
di¤erentiated good sold by the small rms, and a single good produced by a large rm. The
large rm also buys inputs from the small rms, generating a B2B demand. We assume that
the large rm is operating at a scale where non-registration for VAT (i.e. operating so that
the value of sales are below the VAT threshold) is never protable. Finally, a homogenous
input to the small rm is produced by a third sector of competitive rms from a labour
input via a constant returns technology. The behavior of this last sector is summarized by
a zero-prot condition that says that the price of the small-rm input is equal to the wage.
The structure of this economy is illustrated in Figure 1.
Consumers. There is a representative household that has preferences over the homogen-
ous good, consumed at level Y; a set of di¤erentiated goods a 2 [a; a]; consumed at levels
11Both these points are made formally below in the context of our model, and are shown formally in the
not-for-publication appendix.
12That is, registered rms sell only B2B, and non-registered rms sell only B2C.
7
x(a); a 2 [a; a]; and leisure l: These preferences are of the following form:
U(X) + V (Y ) + l; X =
Z a
a
(x(a))(eC 1)=eC da
eC=(eC 1)
; eC > 1 (1)
where X is a CES index of di¤erentiated products, and
U(X) = 1=
X1 1=
1  1=; V (Y ) = (1  )
1= Y
1 1=
1  1= ;  > 0;  > 1
Each di¤erentiated good a is produced by a single small rm a, which can be either registered
for VAT or not. For reasons further discussed below, we also allow the homogenous good Y
to be subject to VAT or not. So, the household faces a budget constraint
P (1 + J:t)Y +
Z a
a
(p(a)(1 + I(a)t) (x(a))(eC 1)=eC da = w(1  l) +  (2)
where 1  l is labour supply, w is the wage, P is the price of the homogenous good produced
by the large rm; p(a) is the price excluding VAT of the small rm a0s output, and where
I(a) 2 f0; 1g is an indicator recording whether the rm registers for VAT or not, with a 1
indicating registration. So, if the rm is registered, the consumer price is grossed up by VAT
i.e. p(a)(1+ t): Finally, J 2 f0; 1g records whether Y is subject to output VAT. Our baseline
case is J = 1; but J = 0 allows an interpretation of the model as a small open economy
where Y is exported; see Section 3.1 below. Consistently with this interpretation, we assume
that if J = 0; good Y is zero-rated for VAT, rather than exempt, so that the large rm can
still claim back input VAT.13. Finally,  is aggregate prot, which can be dened formally
using (10) below; because utility is linear in leisure, there are no income e¤ects in demand
for x(a); Y and so this term plays no further role.
So, by standard arguments, maximization of (1) subject to (2) gives household demand
for the homogenous and di¤erentiated goods:
Y = (1  )(1 + J:t) P  (3)
x(a) = 

(p(a)(1 + I(a)t))
Q
 eC
Q  (4)
13If the large rm were exempt, there would be no di¤erence, from a VAT point of view, between B2B
and B2C demand.
8
where Q is the CES price index corresponding to the quantity index X:14 We assume that
in equilibrium, positive leisure is consumed, so that from (1), the wage is xed at unity.
The Large Firm. The large rm combines inputs y(a); a 2 [a; a] bought from the small
rms via a constant returns CES production technology to produce output Y: This production
technology is characterized by a CES cost function per unit of output of
C =
Z a
a
(p(a))1 eB da
1=(1 eB)
; eB > 1
where p(a) is the price of the input net of tax (as the large rm is VAT-registered, it can claim
back any tax on inputs). So, the large rm chooses p to maximize (1  )P (P  C): This
gives the usual mark-up equation for price i.e.
P =

   1C (5)
and thus, combining (5),(3), ultimately, output is
Y = (1  )(1 + J:t) 


   1C
 
(6)
Finally, input demand for variety a is, by Shepards Lemma and (6):
y(a) =
@C
@p(a)
Y = (1  )(1 + J:t) 


   1
 
C 

p(a)
C
 eB
(7)
The Small Firms. A small rms technology is assumed constant returns and CES, like
the large rm, it is described by the unit cost function, which is specied as:
c(I(a); a) =
1
a
 
!r(1 + I(a)t)1  + (1  !)w1=(1 ) (8)
where r; w are the prices of the intermediate input and labor. By assumption, w = 1; and
we have also assumed, w.l.o.g., that one unit of the intermediate good requires one unit of
labor, so r = 1 also. Note that the cost of the input is grossed up by the tax t if the rm is
not registered, as the rm cannot claim the input tax back.
To interpret (8), note that a is a measure of productivity, and ! is a measure of the
14That is,
Q =
"Z a
a
((1 + I(a)t)p(a))1 eCda
#1=(1 eC)
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rms use of intermediate inputs relative to labour, independently of productivity. To see
this, note that setting I(a) = 0; 1 in (8), and using w = r = 1; we get
c(1; a) =
1
a
< c(0; a) =
1
a
 
!(1 + t)1  + 1  !1=(1 ) (9)
So, the rm has a unit cost that only depends on a unless it is not registered for VAT, in
which case it pays tax t on its input, the cost burden of which is obviously increasing in !:
Generally, as long as the elasticities of demand from the household and the large rm
are di¤erent, i.e. eC 6= eB, the small rm prefers to price discriminate if it can. Moreover,
ruling out price discrimination is not very tractable, as the prot-maximising price cannot
then be solved for in closed form, unless it is assumed that eC = eB.
So, we assume for now that small rms can price-discriminate, setting prices pC(a); pB(a)
for B2C and B2B customers respectively.15 Then, suppressing the dependence of pC ; pB; I
etc. on a to lighten notation, the rms prot is
(pC ; pB; I; a) = x(pC   c(I; a)) + y(pB   c(I; a)) (10)
where from (4), (7):
x = AC (pC(1 + I:t))
 eC ; y = (1  )AB(pB) eB (11)
and where
AC = Q
eC ; AB = (1 + J:t) 


   1
 
CeB  (12)
are parameters that the small rms take as given, but are determined in industry equilibrium.
The small rm chooses pC ; pB 2 [0;1); I 2 f0; 1g to maximize (pC ; pB; I; a) subject to
the registration constraint, which says that if the rm chooses not to register (I = 0), the
value of sales s  pCx + pBy must be less than the VAT sales threshold s: This allows of
course, for voluntary registration, which is dened by a choice I = 1 when s < s.
The costs and benets of registration are clear from equations (10) and (11). The benet
is that registration, I = 1; lowers the unit cost of production. The cost is that at a xed
price, registration lowers B2C sales, because demand by the household is reduced by the tax:
15Of course, if eB = eC is assumed, the price-discrimination assumption becomes trivial.
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3.1 Discussion
Here, we discuss some other modelling choices. First, in practice, there are compliance costs
to VAT registration. These could be introduced to the model, at the cost of some additional
complexity. However, it should be noted that these costs are relatively small for the UK: for
example, a recent literature review found that at the registration threshold, these costs were
around 1.5% of turnover, declining to 0.1% or less for large companies (?), and so we do not
feel it necessary to include these in our analysis16.
Second, it has been argued that the amount of output exported is a determinant of
registration, because in practice, exports are exempt from VAT, and so rms exporting more
of their output are more likely to register (?). Our model could be interpreted to cover
this case. This is because in the case of exports, the exporter does not bear any of the
burden of the output VAT, and so from the suppliers point of view, domestic B2B sales and
exports are equivalent in this respect. So, we could interpret good Y as being purchased
by foreigners, rather than domestic consumers.17 Finally, in our baseline model, we do not
allow for evasion, to avoid overloading the analysis. We introduce evasion in Section 4.4.
4 Analysis
4.1 Necessary Conditions for Voluntary Registration and Bunch-
ing
As already argued above, the coexistence of both voluntary registration and bunching re-
quires that the smallrms make both B2B and B2C sales. This is relatively easy to show
formally in our framework18.
Proposition 1 If all sales are B2C i.e.  = 1; there is no voluntary registration. If all sales
are B2B, i.e.  = 0; all rms register voluntarily, whatever their turnover, so there can be
no bunching. So, to observe both bunching and voluntary registration simultaneously, we
require that there are both B2C and B2B sales i.e. 0 <  < 1:
Proposition 1 is in fact completely general; as shown in the not-for-publication appendix,
it does not rely on our technical assumptions such as iso-elastic demand or constant marginal
16Also, empirically, there are no major changes in compliance requirements duering our sample period.
17In that case, technically, we would have to replace the term 1 + J:t in (3) by 1 + J:t where t is the
foreign rate of VAT.
18All proofs are in the Appendix.
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cost. For the remainder of the theoretical section of the paper, we thus focus on the general
case where 0 <  < 1: Here, we face a problem; generally, AC ; AB are endogenous to ; !
because these are industry-level variables. So, we assume that:
A1: eC = ; eB = :
A1 ensures that the demand parameters are exogenous i.e. from (12), AC = 1; AB =
(1 + J:t) 


 1
 
:
4.2 Voluntary Registration
We now turn to the registration decision, which is a choice I 2 f0; 1g; with the rm then
maximizing prot given its registration decision. To lighten notation, we dene the following
parameters
BC =

eC   1
eC
eC 1
eC   1 ; BB = (1 + J:t)
 

   1

 
eB   1
eB

1
eB   1 (13)
Also, we dene two crucial cost and demand changes. First, the increase in the rms unit
costs due to non-registration, because of input VAT, can be dened independently of rm
productivity a as
c =
c(0; a)
c(1; a)
  1 =  !(1 + t)1  + (1  !)1=(1 )   1 > 0: (14)
Call this the input VAT e¤ect on cost. Second, assuming eB = eC = e; it can be shown that
at any xed price pC = pB = p, the reduction in overall demand for the rms product due
to the charging of output VAT on B2C sales is19
d =
(1  (1 + t) e)
+ (1  )AB =
(1  (1 + t) e)
+ (1  )(1 + J:t) e   e 1
e
e > 0: (15)
This is because when output VAT is charged, at a xed price pC ; all B2C sales (which count
for  of the total) are reduced by a factor (1 + t) e; call this the output VAT e¤ect : We can
then show:
19To see this, note that from (11), the ratio of demand wih registration to without is
(p(1 + t)) e + (1  )ABp e
p e + (1  )ABp e =
(1 + t) e + (1  )AB
+ (1  )AB = 1 d
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Proposition 2 (a) A rm of type a will register voluntarily i¤
aeB eC  BC
(1  )BB
(1 + c)
1 eC   (1 + t) eC
1  (1 + c)1 eB (16)
(b) If the voluntary registration condition (16) holds at ; !; it also holds at !0  !;
0  ; that is, voluntary registration is more likely, the higher the input cost ratio, !; and
the lower the share of B2C sales, :
(c) If eB = eC = e; (16) holds independently of a i¤
T = (1 d) (1 + c)e 1  1 (17)
(d) Assuming eB = eC = e; if the large rm is zero-rated i.e. (J = 0), in the the competitive
limit, as e!1; voluntary registration is always optimal i.e. (17) holds for e high enough,
but if it is not zero-rated, (J = 1); in the competitive limit, voluntary registration is never
optimal.
The voluntary registration condition is most easily interpreted when it is in the form
(17). There, it says that the if the input VAT e¤ect on cost, c due to non-registration is
large relative to the output VAT e¤ect d; there will be voluntary registration. Note also
when eC = eB; T is a su¢ cient statistic that captures the entire e¤ect of the VAT system
on voluntary registration. We will see later that it is also a su¢ cient statistic for the degree
of bunching. Note also that T depends on the parameters of demand and cost functions,
; !; ; e, as well as the tax rate t.
Finally, the comparative statics results in Proposition 2 provide testable predictions. The
predictions regarding the e¤ect of the share of B2C sales ; and the input cost ratio, !; on
voluntary registration are perfectly general. The e¤ect of the level of competition, e; on
voluntary registration can only be established in the competitive limit, however.
To get some further insights on the e¤ect of e on the su¢ cient statistic, T; we report
some numerical simulations. A calibration of ! described in Appendix A implies ! = 0:419,
assuming only a xed-coe¢ cients production function. The parameter  is harder to calibrate
from our data, because to do so, we need to make assumptions about e; which we also want to
vary as a parameter: So, we simply allow  to take on values 0:1; 0:5; and 0:9: Table 1 Panel
A shows the value of T for di¤erent values of  and e; for both the case of zero-rating of the
large rm (J = 0), and the case where it is subject to VAT (J = 1). Voluntary registration
generally occurs when the elasticity e is relatively high and the large rm is zero-rated.
The intuition for these analytical and numerical results is the following. Generally, vol-
untary registration occurs when output e¤ect d is small, and/or when the input VAT e¤ect
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c is large. The rst observation is that other things equal, the larger ; the bigger is the
output VAT e¤ect d; this explains the fact that T falls with : Second, other things equal,
the larger !; the bigger is the input VAT e¤ect c; this explains why T rises with !:
As regards the e¤ect of competition, measured as an increase in e; we can note the
following: First, if the large rm is zero-rated i.e. J = 0; then the term
 
e 1
e
e
(1 + J:t) e = 
e 1
e
e
tends to 0:36; so 1   d tends to a strictly positive number of 0:36(1 )+0:36(1 ) i.e. the
output VAT e¤ect on demand is not too strong20. On the other hand, c is independent of
e; for large e; so the term (1 + c)e 1 dominates in (17), and eventually T > 1: That is, for
large e, the input VAT e¤ect dominates the output VAT e¤ect.
On the other hand, note that when the large rm is not zero-rated (J = 1); then the
output VAT e¤ect becomes very strong; in fact, as e!1; 1 d is proportional to 1=(1 +
t)e; which dominates the input e¤ect (1 + c)e 1: In this case, eventually T ! 0: That is,
for large e, the output VAT e¤ect dominates the input VAT e¤ect.
4.3 Bunching
To get a precise characterization of the determinants of bunching, we assume eC = eB = e.
Now consider what happens if T < 1: Consider a rm a which is just generating a total
value of both B2C and B2B sales s when not registered i.e. has a value of a = a such that
p(a)(x(a) + y(a)) = s (18)
where p(a)x(a) and y(a) denote the optimal price and sales of a non-registered rm, so from
(11);
p(a) =
e
e  1c(0; a); x(a) + y(a) = (+ (1  )AB)(p(a))
 e (19)
Now consider a rm slightly more productive than rm a; that is, with an a0 slightly
above a: Then, as T < 1 (i.e. voluntary registration is never attractive), this rm is
discretely worse o¤ registering than not registering; so, it would be willing to change its price
a little away from the prot-maximizing optimum, in order to stay below the registration
threshold. For example, as demand is elastic, it can do this by cutting price a little. This
implies that there must be an interval of rms, a 2 [a; a + a]; who bunch by restricting
sales in order to stay at the VAT threshold. The value of a+a is given by the indi¤erence
condition that rm a + a has the same prot whether it is registered or not. If (I; a)
denotes optimized prot, conditional on the registration decision I 2 f0; 1g ; this condition
20Note that lime!1
 
e 1
e
e
= lime!1
 
1  1e
e ' 0:36 by standard arguments.
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is
(1; a + a) = (0; a + a) (20)
So, the amount of bunching is measured by a:
Now, we do not observe a; but we do observe rm sales. Following ? and ?, we reason
as follows. First, note from the fact that (that (a+ a); which is unobservable, maps into
s + s; via the relationship
s + s = (+ (1  )AB)

e(1 + c)
e  1
1 e
(a + a)e 1 (21)
Then, combining (20),(21), we can eventually show:
Proposition 3 The level of bunching s is given by the implicit relationship
e
(1 + s=s)
  (e  1)

1
1 + s=s
e=(e 1)
  T = 0 (22)
where T < 1 is the VAT su¢ cient statistic.
Note that the entire e¤ect of VAT on bunching is captured by the su¢ cient statistic
T: Note that here, T < 1; otherwise there is voluntary registration. We can now use (22) to
look at some of the determinants of bunching. We have:
Proposition 4 The amount of bunching s rises (i) as ; the fraction of B2C sales
increases, and (ii) as the share of inputs in total cost, !; falls. Moreover, if the derivative of
T with respect to e is greater than 1, the amount of bunching s falls as e rises.
The intuition for (i) and (ii) is very similar to the case of voluntary registration. That
is, factors that make voluntary registration less attractive also provide incentives for staying
under the VAT threshold by bunching. Specically, this will be the case when most customers
are not VAT-registered, so that the burden of an increase VAT can not easily be passed on
to the buyer, and/or when input costs are relatively unimportant relative to labour costs.
We will bring these predictions to the data below.
Finally, the e¤ect of increased competition on bunching is more subtle and cannot be
established analytically. Some simulation results are reported in Panel B of Table 1, where
each cell reports the solution value s=s to (22) for the given parameters. For some values
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in Table 1, T > 1, and in this case, (22) does not have a solution i.e. there is no bunching,
in which case, we record a zero.
Table 1 Panel B shows rst that the level of bunching always increases with ; consistently
with Proposition 4. Second, other things equal, the amount of bunching is higher if good
Y is taxed, rather than zero-rated. This is consistent with Proposition 2, where voluntary
registration is found to be less likely when good Y is taxed. Finally, the relationship between
the elasticity e and bunching is generally not monotonic. As long as T < 1; the amount
of bunching is generally increasing with e; but then, in the case where good Y is zero-
rated, when T rises above 1, the amount of bunching falls to zero because all rms register
voluntarily.
4.4 VAT Evasion
VAT in the UK has been susceptible to fraud and avoidance, as in many other countries.
According to HMRC estimates, the VAT tax gap, which is dened as the di¤erence between
theoretical VAT liabilities and total VAT receipts on a timely basis, is currently around 10%
of theoretical VAT liability. Some of this gap can be accounted for by VAT debt owed by
rms, and by sophisticated fraud schemes, but most of the VAT gap is probably due to sales
under-reporting and cost over-reporting.21
Here, we model the simplest and most common form of VAT evasion, where the registered
seller does not charge VAT on some proportion of B2C sales, for example by taking a cash
payment for this fraction. If we let this fraction be , the total cost of x units of the good
to the household will be
xp+ (1  )xp(1 + t) = xp(1 + (1  )t):
That is, the household faces an average price of p(1 + (1   )t); and the rm continues
to get revenue p on every unit sold to the household. We will assume that  is exogenously
xed, both for simplicity, and also because there are some analytical issues in endogenizing
it22. The main qualitative points will extend to the endogenous case.23
21For example, ? estimates that the total VAT gap in 2014-14 was 13.1 bilion. Of this, at most £ 1.0
billion is due to Missing Trader Intra-Community fraud, £ 1.2 billion is VAT debt, and nally £ 0.2 billion
due to VAT avoidance. This means that over 80% of the gap is due to other factors.
22Suppose that the rm chooses  to maximize prot minus evasion cost g(): It is easily veried that
optimized prot is convex in v; as it only depends on v via the term (1 + t(1   )) e; which is a convex
function of : So, to have an interior solution, g(v) also has to be su¢ ciently convex in : But then, a
closed-form solution for  cannot be found.
23For example, suppose the cost of evasion is linear in ; up to a limit  < 1: Then, as prot is convex in
; as explained in the previous footnote, and the evasion cost is small, the rm will always choose ; so that
it is e¤ectively exogenous.
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It is then easily veried that as regards voluntary registration, the analysis proceeds much
as before except that the VAT su¢ cient statistic becomes
T () = (1 d())(1 + c)e 1; d() = (1  (1 + (1  )t)
 e)
+ (1  )AB (23)
Thus, with evasion, the output VAT e¤ect depends on  and is smaller than without evasion
i.e. d() < d(0): This is intuitive; with some VAT evaded on sales, output VAT becomes
less of a burden. It then follows that T is increasing in  i.e. voluntary registration is more
likely, the greater the opportunities for evasion, as measured by :
As regards bunching, evasion has two opposing e¤ects. First, evasion allows relaxes the
constraint imposed by the VAT threshold, as the tax authority only observes 1    of B2C
sales, and so the rm can in fact produce over the threshold without registering. Second, as
just discussed, evasion makes registration less costly, output VAT becomes less of a burden
as explained above.
Both of these e¤ects appear formally as follows. With evasion, we show in the not-for-
publication Appendix B that the term T in the bunching equation (22) is replaced by
T^ () = T ()
(1  ) + (1  )AB
+ (1  )AB (24)
and in particular, positive bunching will occur when T^ () is less than 1.24 So, an increase in
 has two opposing e¤ects, as just described. First, T^ () falls, making bunching more likely,
via the second term in (24), (1 )+(1 )AB
+(1 )AB ; this captures the constraint relaxation e¤ect:
Second, T^ () rises, via the fact that T () rises; this captures the e¤ect that evasion reduces
the burden of output VAT.
Note that with evasion, the qualitative e¤ects of  and ! on T do not change, and so
our predictions about the determinants of voluntary registration do not change; this is clear
by inspection from (23). This is also true of bunching; it is seen by inspection that T^ () is
decreasing in ; and increasing in !; as is T: So, our key empirical predictions are robust to
the presence of evasion. We can summarize as follows:
Proposition 5 If evasion is possible, the likelihood of voluntary registration rises with
evasion ; whereas the e¤ect of evasion on bunching is ambiguous. Moreover, evasion does
not a¤ect our qualitative predictions about the e¤ects of ; the fraction of B2C sales, and
as the share of inputs in total cost, !; on voluntary registration and bunching.
24For a formal proof, see the not-for-publication Appendix in Section B.
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However, as discussed in Section 1, we do not measure evasion directly. Nor do we have
any obvious way of decomposing the total bunching e¤ect into bunching due to evasion, and
that due to a real response, although this can be done plausibly for business taxes in some
other countries, using special features of national tax systems.25 Our empirical strategy
focuses primarily on identifying the e¤ects of changes in the B2C ratio and input cost ratio
as predicted by the theory, without taking a view on how much of this e¤ect works through
evasion.
4.5 The Elasticity of the Tax Base
Note that (22) is closely related to the Kleven-Waseem formula relating bunching at a notch
of the personal income tax schedule to the elasticity of the labour supply, eL. In their
equation, the tax notch is measured by the term t=(1   t); where t is the lower rate of
income tax, and t is the increase in the tax rate at the notch. In fact, it is easily veried
if we take (22) and substitute eL = e   1; replace s=s by z=z; and replace T 1=e by
1  t
1 t ; we get equation (5) in their paper.
In the context of the personal income tax, ? uses (22) in a reverse way to us, to make
inferences about the elasticity of taxable income eL given an estimate of z=z from the
data. The question then arises as to whether we can use (22) in the same way. The rst
question is whether it is worthwhile i.e. what interpretation we can give to e. It is possible to
show that if good Y is taxed (J = 1), and production is xed-coe¢ cients ( = 0), then the
value-added of a registered small rm i.e. the base of the VAT for that rm is proportional
to (1 + t) e; so the elasticity of the tax base with respect to 1 + t is e (see Appendix A). So,
there is some interest in trying to recover e from (22). However, there are two complications
here.
First, the unlike the personal income tax case, VAT su¢ cient statistic T does not depend
just on the tax code. In particular, also depends on model parameters, for example,  and
! even if  = 0; and also on  if evasion is assumed. This means in turn that recovery
of e from (22) means making assumptions about these parameters. As shown in the not-
for-publication Appendix B, ! can be calibrated from our data, but  and  are harder to
specify.
Second, as shown in ?, in the presence of a notch, the elasticity of the tax base (in
the case of the personal income tax, taxable income), is no longer a su¢ cient statistic for
25For example, ? use a minimum tax scheme for corporations in Pakistan which has a kink point where
the real incentive for bunching is small, but the evasion incentive is large, and they nd large bunching
around the minimum tax kink. ?, again for Pakistan, shows very large responses when reforms cut the rate
of income tax to zero for the self-employed, which he interprets as being largely an evasion response.
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the marginal deadweight loss of the tax, so elasticity estimates are of less interest from a
normative point of view. So, for these reasons, we do not attempt elasticity estimates.
4.6 Summary of Theoretical Results
We now summarize the theoretical results in Figure 2, which shows how rms of productivity
type a behave as T varies. The gure is drawn under the simplifying assumption that eC = eB
and that there is no evasion: In this case, we know that all rms register for VAT if T > 1.
So, all rms with a > a are registered with a turnover above the threshold, but all rms
with a < a are voluntarily registered, where a is dened in (18) above.
When T falls below 1, rms a 2 [a; a+a] start to bunch at the registration threshold.
as T falls, this bunching interval becomes larger. So, for any xed value of T; rms can now
be in one of three regimes: when a is low, the rm will be unconstrained but below the
threshold, when a is high, the rm will be unconstrained and above the threshold and thus
registered, and when a is intermediate, the rm will be just at the threshold.
It is also clear from Figure 2 how voluntary registration and bunching may coexist in any
given industry. Some fraction of rms may have a T > 1; so the lower-productivity ones in
this group will be voluntarily registered. At the same time, some other fraction may have a
T < 1; so some of this latter group will be bunching.
5 Context and Data
5.1 The Value-Added Tax System in the UK
The Value-Added tax in the UK is remitted by approximately 2 million registered businesses
in each scal year. It is the third largest source of government revenue following income tax
and national insurance contributions. In 2011/12, VAT raised £ 98.2 billion, accounting for
21.1% of total tax revenue and 6.5% of GDP in the UK.26
VAT is levied on most goods and services provided by registered businesses in the UK,
goods and some services imported from countries outside the European Union (EU), and
brought into the UK from other EU countries. All businesses must register for VAT if their
taxable turnover is above a given threshold.27 A VAT registered business pays VAT on its
purchases (input tax), and charges VAT on the full sale price of the taxable supplies (output
26See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax receipts/tax-receipts-and-taxpayers.pdf.
27VAT taxable turnover includes the value of any goods or services a business supplies within the UK,
unless they are exempt from VAT. Any supplies that would be zero-rated for VAT are included as part of
the taxable turnover.
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tax). Businesses can also choose to register voluntarily with a turnover below the threshold
in order to recover the input taxes.
The default VAT rate is the standard rate, which was 17.5% between April 1, 2004 and
December 1, 2008 and was temporarily reduced to 15% before January 1, 2010. The standard
rate was then reverted to 17.5% until 4 January 2011 when it was increased to 20% and has
been at that rate since. A small number of goods and services have VAT levied at a reduced
rate of 5% and there are also goods and services that are charged at a zero rate or are
exempt from VAT altogether.28. Neither businesses that make zero-rate or exempt supplies
charge output VAT to the customers, and the key di¤erence between them is that input tax
cannot be claimed against output tax on exempted supplies. The registration thresholds and
standard rate of VAT over our sample period are shown in Table 2
The increase in registration threshold tracks the rate of ination.29 The UK has the
highest registration threshold in the EU, which is perceived as a way for the government to
reduce the compliance costs of small businesses not wishing to register for VAT.30
There are two rules governing registration, a forward-looking rule and a backward-looking
one. Under the forward-looking rule, a rm must also register for VAT if its VAT taxable
turnover is likely to go over the threshold in the next 30 days. Under the backward-looking
rule, a rm must register if its VAT-taxable turnover in the previous 12 months was above
the threshold. Strictly speaking, our theoretical model is static and applies to the forward-
looking decision; that is, the rm must register if turnover in the current year is expected to
exceed the threshold. In our sample, around 68% of rst-time registers have a previous-year
turnover less than the VAT threshold. This suggests that the forward-looking decision is
more important.
5.2 Data
We construct our dataset by linking the universe of VAT returns to the universe of corpora-
tion tax records in the UK. The rst data set provides detailed information for businesses in
28A reduced rate of 5% is charged on a small number of supplies under schedule 7A of the Value Added
Tax Act (VATA) 1994. Principally, they include the supply of domestic fuel and power, the installation of
energy saving materials, womens sanitary products, childrens car seats and certain types of construction
work.
29Specically, under Article 24(2)(c) of the sixth EC VAT directive (77/388/EEC 17 May 1977). These
provisions are now consolidated in the principal VAT directive (2006/112/EC); article 287 allows for States
to increase the registration threshold in line with ination. As far as we are aware, there is no interaction
between the VAT registration threshold with other major taxes in the UK, not does it change the probability
of being audited for rms around the threshold.
30Small rms with annual taxable turnover of up to £ 150,000 can use a simplied at-rate VAT scheme,
but are subject to the same registration threshold. The at-rate scheme is not widely used. In 2007, only
16% of eligible rms were registered under the at-rate scheme (?).
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di¤erent legal forms including sole traders, partnerships, and companies that are registered
for VAT. To obtain information on non-VAT registered businesses, we link the VAT records
to the population of corporation tax records based on a common anonymised taxpayer ref-
erence number. The linked dataset allows us to identify both registers and non-registers for
the population of UK companies, and contains rich information on VAT and corporation tax
for each company and year.
We further merge the linked tax dataset with two additional data sources: (1) the FAME
(Financial Analysis Made Easy) annual company account database for additional rm char-
acteristics and accounting information and (2) the annual sector-level statistics on the share
of sales to nal consumers based on the O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS) Input-Output
Tables. The last data source gives us an empirical proxy for ; the share of sales that are
B2C at the 2-digit SIC industry level.
The nal dataset contains 731,706 observations for 435,688 companies between April 1,
2004 and March 30, 2010.31 For each company-year observation, we have information on the
VAT-exclusive turnover taken from the corporate tax records, and whether the company is
registered for VAT.32We examine a few key factors that drive rmsdecisions about voluntary
registration, including the share of input cost relative to total turnover (input-cost ratio),
the share of sales to nal consumers (B2C sales ratio), rm-specic history of registration,
and the degree of industry-level competitiveness (measured by four-rm concentration ratio,
or CR4)33.
31We take several steps to rene the sample to study the VAT registration decisions of individual companies.
First, we eliminate companies which are part of a larger VAT group and focus only on standalone independent
companies. This is because companies under common controlfor example, subsidiaries of a parent company
can register as a VAT group and submit only one VAT return for all companies in a VAT group.
Second, we drop all observations with partial-year tax or accounting records because the registration
decision can be based on turnover in the previous 12 months. We further eliminate companies that mainly
engage in overseas activities based on the HMRC trade classication. This is because the taxable VAT
turnover is based on sales of goods and services within the UK. Finally, we drop companies with an e¤ective
rate of VAT that is less than 10%, where the e¤ective rate is the output VAT relative to VAT-eligible sales
for registered companies, to form the main sample for empirical analysis. Empirical results based on the
full sample that include all rms with an e¤ective VAT rate below 10% are quantitatively similar to those
obtained using the main sample and are available upon request.
32Our empirical analysis is based on turnover reported in the CT600 for two reasons. The rst is mechan-
ical: we only observe turnover liable for VAT for rms that are registered. The second is related to salience
given that rms that are not registered for VAT are more likely to base their registration decision on the
overall amount of turnover, instead of computing a separate measure of turnover that is subject to VAT. To
see whether this is true, we predict (out-of-sample) the amount of turnover liable for VAT for unregistered
rms, by regressing the amount of turnover liable for VAT on the amount of total turnover and a full set of
industry and year dummies. We then plot a similar histogram of turnover as in Figure 2 Panel B based on
actual/predicted turnover liable for VAT for registered/unregistered rm. Bunching below the VAT notch
is still present, but much more noisy and imprecise comparing to bunching based on total turnover reported
in CT600. The empirical di¤erences suggest that for unregistered rms, they are more likely to rely on the
overall turnover gure for their VAT registration decisions.
33We calculate the concentration ratio based on the market shares of the four largest rms in an industry,
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We use two di¤erent data sets to test related hypotheses developed in Section 3. First,
we use all the rms with turnover below the current-year VAT registration threshold to
examine the choice of voluntary registration. We say that a rm is voluntarily registered if
it has never registered before and has a turnover below the VAT threshold, or that if it was
registered in the previous year and has a turnover below the VAT deregistration threshold.
In the main sample, 62.5% of rms have a turnover below the VAT threshold, and of these,
44.1% of them are registered for VAT. So, overall, 27.6% of rms in the main sample of
companies are voluntarily registered. Second, we focus on rms with turnover within the
neighboring of the registration threshold, i.e. between £ 10,000 and £ 200,000, to analyze the
extent of bunching below the VAT notch.
5.3 Summary Statistics
Figure 3 presents convincing evidence that the VAT registration threshold is binding in the
UK, by showing a histogram of the normalized turnover by pooling data between 2004/05
and 2009/10, where the normalized turnover is dened as rmsnominal turnover net of
the current-year VAT notch. There is an evident excess of mass just below the notch and a
small missing mass above, in the otherwise smooth distribution of turnover. However, it is
worth noting that relative to some other studies, the excess mass below the threshold is not
sharply bunched at the notch. A plausible explanation is that rms have less control over
their turnover than individuals do over their earnings for example. Alternatively, rms that
benet from voluntary registration can also stay below the registration threshold.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for companies in the neighborhood of current-year
VAT notch, i.e. those with nominal turnover of between £ 10,000 and £ 200,000. The rst
three columns report the mean, standard deviation and the number of non-missing obser-
vations for the key variables used in empirical analysis. Companies in this turnover region
account for around 52.94% of all companies in the linked dataset. Columns (4)-(6) focus
on the registered companies while columns (7)-(9) focus on the non-registered. The last
two columns test whether there is any signicant di¤erence between the means of the two
groups, by reporting the t statistic and the corresponding p-value in columns (9) and (10),
respectively.
based on the larger dataset of population of corporate tax records.
22
6 Voluntary Registration
6.1 Evidence on Voluntary Registration
In this section, we examine whether the decision of voluntary registration is consistent with
the theory in the three key aspects as predicted by Proposition 2, including whether a rm
is more likely to voluntarily register for VAT if it mainly sells to nal consumers, has a larger
share of inputs in cost, or in a more competitive industry.
We rst note in Table 4 that the empirical pattern is broadly consistent with Proposition
2. As the share of B2C sales falls, i.e. when moving from the fourth (Q4) to the rst quartile
(Q1), the share of voluntarily registered rms tends to rise. Similarly, as the input cost ratio
rises, the share of voluntarily registered rms tends to increase.
Next, we model the decision of voluntary registration in a binary choice model of the
following form:
Rit = 1 + 2B2Cj(i) + 3ICRit + 4CR4j(i) + 5Xit + t + i + it; (25)
where Rit is a dummy indicator that takes value 1 if the rm is voluntarily registered and zero
otherwise. The key variables of interest are B2Cj(i), the industry-level B2C ratio for rm i
(that is, rm i in industry j(i)), ICRit, the input cost ratio for rm i in year t; and CR4j(i);
the four-rm concentration ratio to measure competition in industry j in which rm i is
located. Xit are other rm-level controls, i and t are time-invariant rm xed e¤ects and
year dummies, and it is the error term. We estimate equation (25) in a linear probability
framework based on the standard OLS assumptions and in a xed-e¤ect logit model. The
regression sample includes all rms with turnover below the current-year VAT registration
threshold. Consistent with Proposition 2, we expect that 2 > 0, 3 > 0; whereas the sign
of 4 is uncertain.
Table 5 reports the estimation results from the linear probability model.34 Columns
(1)-(3) includes each of the key variables at a time, and column (4) includes all three key
variables in the regression. Without inclusion of rm xed e¤ects, we can examine the e¤ect
of industry-level B2C sales ratio and CR4 ratio on the probability of voluntary registration
in the rst four columns. The coe¢ cient estimates are negative and statistically signicant,
indicating that the likelihood to voluntarily register for VAT is reduced by around 4 percent-
age points given a one-standard-deviation increase in the B2C sales ratio, and by around 0.2
to 1 percentage point given a one-standard-deviation increase in the CR4 ratio.
34The estimation results from the xed-e¤ects logit model are very similar and available from the authors
upon request.
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The rest of columns add rm xed e¤ects and the coe¢ cients on the B2C and CR4 ratios
are often imprecisely estimated due to limited time-series variation at the industry level. For
comparison, column (5) does not include any additional controls, whereas column (6) adds
rm-level trading prot and age since incorporation. Columns (7) checks the robustness of
the results by replacing the salary-inclusive input cost ratio calculated from the corporation
tax records with the salary-exclusive input cost ratio calculated from FAME. The latter
improves precision in the measurement of input cost, but substantially reduces the sample
size given that few rms report the direct cost of sales. The coe¢ cient estimate for the input
cost ratio remains positive and highly signicant throughout the di¤erent specications.
Moreover, the coe¢ cient estimates for the B2C sales ratio and CR4 ratio are negative and
signicant at 10% level in column (7). Focusing on results in columns (4) and (7), the
likelihood of voluntarily registering for VAT is increased by around 1 percentage point given
a one standard deviation increase in the input cost ratio.
7 Evidence on Bunching
7.1 Estimation Methodology
As set out in the conceptual framework in Section 3, the VAT registration threshold at
the cuto¤ turnover value s will induce excess bunching at the threshold by companies for
which voluntary registration is not optimal. We are interested in constructing the empirical
equivalent ofs=s: First, we measures, the amount of excess bunching, as the di¤erence
between the observed and predicted bin counts over the excluded range that falls below the
VAT notch:
^s =
sX
i=s 
(cj   bcj):
Here, cj is the actual number of rms in each £ 100 turnover bin, and bcj is the counterfactual
bin counts without the notch. The range
 
s ; s

+

species turnover bins around the notch
where bunching occurs and are therefore excluded from predicting the counterfactual distri-
bution. Specically, the lower bound of the excluded turnover region, s , is set at the point
where excess bunching starts. The upper bound of the excluded region, s+, is estimated in
an iteration procedure to ensure that the excess mass below the VAT notch is equal to the
missing mass above.35 We then measure the amount of bunching by b = ^s=s; where s is
simply the VAT threshold for that year.
35We follow the standard procedure to estimate the counterfactual distribution. By grouping companies
into small turnover bins of £ 100, we estimate the counterfactual distribution around the VAT notch s in
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7.2 Bunching Evidence
7.2.1 Baseline Estimates
This section presents evidence of bunching below the VAT notch using the main sample
of companies with turnover between £ 10,000 and £ 200,000. Figure 4 presents bunching
around the threshold in each nancial year between 2004/05 and 2009/10. Panel A shows
the empirical distribution of turnover (blue dots) as a histogram in £ 1,000 bins and the
estimated counterfactual distribution (red line) in 2004-05. Each dot denotes the upper
bound of a given bin and represents the number of companies in each turnover bin of £ 1,000.
Similar to ? and ?, we estimate the counterfactual distribution by tting a exible polynomial
of order 3 to the empirical distribution, excluding rms in the excluded range close to the
VAT notch.36 The lower bound of the excluded turnover range is demarcated by the vertical
dashed line and the VAT notch demarcated by the vertical solid line.37 The next ve panels
focus on subsequent years during which the VAT notch was increased annually to track
ination. Each panel reports the estimated bunching ratio (b) and its standard error in in
parenthesis.
Three main ndings are worth noting in Figure 4. First, the VAT notch creates evident
bunching below the threshold. Excess bunching ranges from 0.82 to 1.29 times the height
of the counterfactual distribution, and is strongly signicant in all years during the sample
period.38 Second, excess bunching tracks precisely the annual change in the nominal VAT
notch due to adjustment to ination. In each year the excess bunching is concentrated within
£ 2,000 below the VAT. Third, in contrast with the large bunching below the threshold, there
is a small hole in the distribution above the VAT notch. The range of the hole spans from
£ 8,500 to £ 15,000 above the cuto¤, although we do not attempt to estimate the magnitude
of optimization frictions implied by the hole given the various reason discussed in section 3.
In ?, it is argued that in the context of the personal income tax, bunching is much more
the following regression:
cj =
qX
l=0
i (sj)
l
+
s+X
i=s 
iI fj = ig+ "j ; (26)
where cj is the number of companies in turnover bin j, sj is the distance between turnover bin j and the
VAT notch s, q is the order of the polynomial, and I fg is an indicator function. The error term "j reects
misspecication of the density equation.
36As a robustness check we have tried values between 3 and 5 for the order of the polynomial and our
results are not signicantly changed.
37The upper bound of the excluded turnover region is estimated in an iteration procedure to ensure that
the area under the estimated counterfactual density is equal the area under the observed density.
38Unlike to studies analysing bunching in the taxable income of individuals (?) and corporations (?), we
do not nd any evident bunching at round numbers. The absence of round-number bunching suggests that
rms have less control over their turnover than reported taxable earnings.
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likely to be due evasion, rather than to real earnings responses. Here, as already noted, both
evasion and real responses may be driving observed bunching. Our main approach is not to
try to decompose observed bunching into a real and evasion part, but just to note that our
theory, which includes an evasion element, makes predictions about how bunching will vary
with the share of B2C sales and the input cost ratio, and we turn to this next. However, in
Section 7.2.3 below, we do address the evasion issue, and show some evidence that bunching
may partly be due to turnover misreporting.
7.2.2 Heterogeneity in Bunching
We have shown a stable distribution of turnover throughout the entire period 2004/05-
2009/10, with an evident and persistent bunching of companies below the VAT notch in
each year. We now explore potential heterogeneity in bunching to see whether the empirical
pattern is consistent with the predictions set out in Proposition 3, that rms are more likely
to bunch below the VAT notch if the share of B2C sales is high, or the share of input costs
is low. We will also investigate the e¤ect of the level of competition in the industry where
the rm is located, although that is predicted to have an ambiguous e¤ect theoretically.
First, we explore how companies with di¤erent B2C sales ratio respond to the same VAT
notch by dividing companies into four groups according to the quartiles of B2C sales ratio.
We estimate annual bunching ratios separately for each quartile, and plot the point estimate
of the bunching ratio with the corresponding 95% condence intervals in Figure 5. There
are two interesting ndings in Figure 5. First, all bunching estimates are positive and highly
signicant, even in the lowest B2C quartile where on average between 0.3% and 25.4% of
sales are B2C. Second, there is a clear pattern that the estimated bunching ratio increases
with quartiles of the B2C sales ratio. In particular, the estimated bunching ratio for rms
in the top quartile is signicantly larger than for rms in the bottom quartile. The observed
strong aggregate bunching is mainly driven by the behavioral responses of companies in the
3rd and 4th quartile of the B2C sales ratio.
To explore how companies with di¤erent shares of direct input cost respond to the same
VAT notch, we construct a rm-specic measure of average input-cost ratio during the
sample period and divide all companies into four groups according to the quartiles of input-
cost ratio. We obtain information on direct cost of sales excluding salary from company
accounts in FAME and since it is optional for small and medium-sized companies to disclose
this information, only 12.52% of companies in the estimation sample report a non-missing
direct cost of sales. To increase e¢ ciency of the empirical test, we pool observations with non-
missing input cost in all years and present bunching evidence with respect to the normalized
VAT notch in Figure 6.
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Panel A compares the empirical distributions of companies around the normalized VAT
notch across quartiles of the input-cost ratio. It presents clear evidence that the degree
of bunching decreases with the input-cost ratio. The distribution of companies in the top
quartile is quite smooth around the normalized VAT notch, while distributions of companies
in the lower quartiles all exhibit some degree of bunching just below the VAT notch. Panel B
quanties the di¤erence in the extent of bunching by plotting the estimated bunching ratio
with the corresponding 95% condence interval for each input-cost ratio quartile. Quantitat-
ively, the bunching estimate is very small and insignicant for companies in the top quartile
of the input-cost ratio distribution. In contrast, the bunching estimates for companies in the
lower quartiles of the input-cost ratio are positive and highly signicant.
Finally, we examine the extent of bunching depending on the degree of competition in
the product market. We measure competition at the industry level using the four-rm
concentration ratio (CR4), so a high CR4 is associated with a lower level of competition.
As in the previous cases, we examine how bunching varies across quartiles of the CR4 ratio
in Figure 7. Panel A demonstrates that bunching clearly increases as the CR4 increases,
whereas Panel B quanties the di¤erence in the extent of bunching by plotting the bunching
estimates with the corresponding 95% condence interval. All the bunching estimates are
signicantly di¤erent from zero, and there is an substantial increase in the degree of bunching
at the third and fourth quartile of the CR4 ratio where there is less competition in the product
market.
7.2.3 Bunching via Turnover Misreporting
In this section, we provide some suggestive evidence on the extent of bunching due to turnover
misreporting. When bunching is due to a decrease in real output, we expect companies to
reduce their input costs in proportion, so that the distribution of input-cost ratio for non-
registered companies should be smooth around the VAT notch. When bunching is due to
turnover misreporting, we conjecture that the non-registered companies are less likely to
under-report their input costs and wage expenses. Both costs are deductible for corporation
taxes and the latter is subject to third-party reporting. In other words, the gain from under-
reporting the deductible costs is considerably smaller than the gain from under reporting
the turnover to avoid VAT registration. If the majority of companies bunch via turnover
misreporting, we would expect to see a higher average input-cost ratio for the non-registered
group just below the VAT notch, relative to that for the registered group.
Figure 8 pools all observations in the sample period and plots the distribution of av-
erage input-cost ratio for registered and non-registered companies in £ 1,000 turnover bins,
respectively. In Panel A, the input-cost ratio is salary exclusive and represents the share of
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direct cost of sales relative to total turnover. The solid blue line shows the average input
cost relative to sales for registered companies within each turnover bin of £ 1,000 normalized
by the current-year VAT notch, and the dashed blue line shows the average input cost ra-
tio for the unregistered companies. Consistent with the theory, voluntary registers incur a
much larger input cost as indicated by their average input-cost ratio which is consistently
larger than that for the non-registered companies below the VAT notch. On the other hand,
there is no evident increase in the average input-cost ratio just below the VAT notch for the
non-registered group. The distribution is relatively smooth and continues to increase with
turnover above the VAT notch.
In comparison, Panel B plots the distribution of average input-cost ratio inclusive of
salary, for registered and non-registered companies, respectively. There is striking di¤erence
between the two input-cost ratio series just below the VAT notch. The two series move in
parallel directions until the average input-cost ratio for the non-registered companies starts to
increase drastically just below the VAT notch. The sharp increase in the salary-inclusive cost
ratio can be partly attributed to the xed nature of salary cost which takes longer to adjust
than variable costs of input. On the other hand, the sharp increase is also consistent with
the fact that salary is subject to third-party reporting and thus it is more costly/di¢ cult for
small businesses to underreport salary expenses. Overall, Panel A and B in Figure 8 provide
suggestive yet not conclusive evidence that part of bunching is due to turnover misreporting.
8 Evidence on Dynamics
One limitation of our study so far is that we do not consider dynamic behavior of rms.
Changing registration status involves some cost to the rm. This raises the possibility, in
particular, that rms who were initially above the registration threshold and fall below may
stay registered, simply because of the cost of deregistration. So, some of the rms who seem
to be voluntary registered may just be behaving in this way because of inertia.
In this section, we investigate the importance of inertia in driving VAT registration by
analyzing the dynamic behavior of rms when they cross registration and deregistration
thresholds. First, we compute a transition probability matrix for rms moving between
registration states in Table C.1, which shows the probability of being registered or not
registered t years after initially being in a given state.39 For example, the entry in the
rst cell of the matrix, 89.3%, shows that of all the rms that where initially registered in
2004/05, 89.3% remain registered a year later.
39Changes in the transition probability could also driven by attrition, therefore we focus on a balanced
sample of rms that we observe throughout the sample period.
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Table C.1 shows that there is considerable persistence in registration status. On the
other hand, comparing to the registered rms, this persistence does decline substantially
over time for non-registered rms. For example, only 88% of initially non-registered rms
remain unregistered after 5 years, whereas 97% of registered rms remain registered after 5
years. The di¤erence in persistence is due to the fact that the majority of rms are growing
over our sample, and so will tend to stay above the registration threshold once they cross it.
Next, we investigate to what extent is the persistence in registration status driven by
persistence in turnover versus the costs of changing registration status. To answer this
question, we augment equation (5) as follows:
Rit = 0 + 1Ri;t 1 + 2(1 Rit 1)IRit + 3Rit 1IDit + 4B2Cj(it) + 5ICRit (27)
+6CR4it + 7X it + t + i + it;
where Rit is a dummy indicator that takes value 1 if the rm is currently registered and zero
otherwise, as dened previously in Section 6. In addition,
IRit =
(
1; Yit  Zt
0; Yit < Zt
; IDit =
(
1; Yit  Z 0t
0; Yit < Z
0
t
;
where Zt, Z 0t are the registration and deregistration thresholds at time t; Yit denotes the
current-period turnover, so IRit and IDit are dummy indicators recording whether the rm
is above the registration and deregistration thresholds respectively at time t. All the other
variables are dened as before, and it is the error term. We estimate equation (27) in a
xed-e¤ect Probit model, and augment the estimation equation with the initial registration
status Ri0 and the mean characteristics of all the time-varying regressors (?).
So, if rm registration decision was entirely backward-looking and ignores its current
turnover relative to Zt; Z 0t, we would expect the coe¢ cients 2 to 5 to be insignicant.
However, we expect most rms to comply with the VAT law. Specically, we expect rms to
register when they are initially not registered and their turnover passes above the threshold.
Such a rm has a value 1 for the term (1   Rit 1)IRit and so we expect to nd a positive
2:
The VAT legislation also requires rms to stay registered if they are registered in the
previous year and their current turnover is above the deregistration threshold. Such a rm
will have a value of 1 for Rit 1IDit: So, we also expect to nd that 3 > 0: On the other hand,
if the rm remains registered simply due to the cost of deregistration such that whether
crossing the deregistration threshold plays no role in the registration behavior, we would
expect to nd that 3 = 0.
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Finally, we already know from our analysis of voluntary registration that the registration
decision is signicantly a¤ected by the industry B2C ratio B2Cj(it); the rm input cost ratio
ICRit; and the industry-level four-rm concentration ratio CR4j(it); so we expect 4; 5 and
6 to be positive.
Table 6 summarizes the results from estimation of (27), by reporting the partial e¤ects
of the variables of interest using coe¢ cient estimates from the xed-e¤ect Probit model.40
Column (1) shows the mean predicted probability of VAT registration at xed value of
Rt 1, IDt, IRt, the mean predicted probability across all rms in the sample and that
for one-standard-deviation increase in the B2C, ICR, and CR4 ratios. Column (2) shows
the average partial e¤ects of these variables by taking the di¤erence in the mean predicted
probabilities given the change in their value. For example, for rms that are registered in
the previous year, falling below the deregistration threshold lowers the probability of being
currently registered by 10.9 percentage points. Alternatively, for rms that are not registered
in the previous year, going above the registration threshold increases their probability of
registration by 19.7 percentage points. These ndings suggest that the registration decision
is not entirely driven by the cost of deregistration or inertia.
Finally, the short-run partial e¤ects of the B2C ratio and input cost ratio in the dynamic
model are considerably smaller than the static estimates in section 6. A one standard
deviation increase in the B2C ratio and CR4 ratio reduces the probability of registration by
0.2 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively, where there is no change in the probability of
registration for one standard deviation increase in the input cost ratio.
Overall, we see that while there is a considerable amount of persistence in rm behavior,
the registration decision is not entirely driven by inertia due to xed cost of deregistra-
tion. Firms respect the legal registration requirement, and at the same time change their
registration decisions in a way that is consistent with prot maximization behavior depicted
in Section 3. The probability of registration is also a¤ected signicantly by the more fun-
damental determinants of VAT registration. The positive coe¢ cient estimates and partial
e¤ects of Rit 1IDit, the B2C ratio and input cost ratios provides supportive evidence that
the VAT registration decision is rational and relates to the fundamental determinants of VAT
40The coe¢ cient estimates are reported in the Appendix Table C.2. We calculate the estimated average
partial e¤ects (APEs) of the variables of interests following ?, where the partial e¤ect refers to the e¤ect
on the mean probability of registration after averaging the unobserved heterogeneity across all rms in the
sample. For example, to calculate the APE of a discrete change of ID from 0 to 1, we rst compute the
average predicted probability of registration at xed values of Rt 1 = 1; IDt = 0 and Rt 1 = 1; IDt = 1,
respectively, across all rms in the sample. We then take the di¤erence between the two average probabilities
to obtain the average partial e¤ect of ID. We use a similar procedure to compute the average partial e¤ect of
a one-standard-deviation increase in B2C, ICR, and CR4, noting that the one-standard-deviation increase
applies to their mean characteristics in addition to the time-varying values.
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registration as suggested by the theory in Section 3.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we rst developed a conceptual framework which can explain the co-existence
of VAT voluntary registration and bunching. We showed that this required that rms sell
both to nal consumers (B2C) and to other rms (B2B) for this to happen. This framework
predicts that voluntary registration is more likely, and bunching is less likely, when either
(i) the cost of inputs relative to sales is high, or (ii) when the proportion of B2C sales is
low. Additionally, evasion opportunities will generally make voluntary registration more
likely, while having an ambiguous e¤ect on bunching. Also, the e¤ect of product-market
competition on both voluntary registration and bunching is generally ambiguous.
We then brought these predictions to an administrative data-set that is created by linking
the population of corporation and VAT tax records in the UK, and showed that the pattern
of voluntary registration in the data is consistent with the theory. In particular, voluntary
registration is more likely with a low share of B2C sales high share of inputs in cost, and
more competition in the industry. Moreover, there is clear evidence of bunching at the VAT
threshold. Investigating further, we saw that, consistently with the theory, there is a clear
pattern of heterogeneity in bunching; the amount of bunching is increasing in the B2C sales
ratio, and decreasing in share of ratio of input costs to sales and the amount of competition
in the industry.
We also investigated the dynamic behavior of rms around the VAT notch. Specically,
we addressed the concern that voluntary registration may not be an optimizing choice of
rms, but simply a failure to deregister, once having been above the threshold and having
registered. Our empirical ndings suggest that while there is a considerable amount of
persistence in rm behavior, perhaps due to the xed compliance costs of deregistration, the
decision is not entirely driven by inertia; rms change their registration decisions in a way
that is consistent with prot maximizing behavior.
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Figure 1. STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
Notes: this gure shows the key features of the economy in which we model beha-
viourial responses of rms with respect to the VAT threshold, including voluntary
registration and bunching.
Figure 2. SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL RESULTS
Notes: this gure shows how rms of productivity types a behave as the VAT
su¢ cient statistic T varies.
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Figure 3. A BINDING VAT NOTCH
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Notes: this gure shows the histogram of companies within the neighbourhood of
turnover net of current-year VAT registration threshold (normalized VAT notch)
by pooling data between 2004/05-2009/10. The bin width is £ 1,000 and the dashed
line denotes the normalized VAT notch.
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Figure 4. BUNCHING AT VAT NOTCH
A. 2004-05 B. 2005-06
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Notes: this gure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated
counterfactual distribution (solid-smooth line) of turnover for each year in 2004/05-
2009/10. The counterfactual is a three-order polynomial estimated as in eq. (26). The
excluded ranges around the VAT notch are demarcated by the vertical-dashed lines, and
the VAT notch is demarcated by the vertical solid line. Bunching b is excess mass in the
excluded range around the VAT notch relative to the average counterfactual frequency
in this range. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Figure 5. BUNCHING ACROSS B2C SALES RATIO QUARTILES
A. 2004-05 B. 2005-06
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Notes: the gure plots the point estimate of the bunching ratio b with the corresponding
95% condence intervals across four di¤erent quartiles of industry-level B2C sales ratio
in each year during 2004/05-2009/10.
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Figure 6. BUNCHING ACROSS INPUT-COST RATIO QUARTILES
A. Bunching Evidence
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
N
um
be
r o
f C
om
pa
ni
es
-50 0 50 100
Turnover - VAT Notch (£1,000)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
B. Bunching Estimates
0
.5
1
1.
5
B
un
ch
in
g 
Es
tim
at
es
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Input Cost Ratio Quartile
Notes: the gure shows the observed distribution of turnover across four di¤erent quart-
iles of input cost ratio within the neighbourhood of normalized VAT notch in 2004/05-
2009/10 in Panel A. Panel B then plots the point estimate of the bunching ratio b and
the corresponding 95% condence intervals across the four quartiles of input cost ratio
by pooling all the data in the sample years.
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Figure 7. BUNCHING ACROSS FOUR-FIRM CONCENTRATION RATIO QUARTILES
A. Bunching Evidence
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Notes: the gure shows the observed distribution of turnover across four di¤erent quart-
iles of four-frim concentration ratio (CR4) within the neighbourhood of normalized VAT
notch in 2004/05-2009/10 in Panel A. Panel B then plots the point estimate of the bunch-
ing ratio b and the corresponding 95% condence intervals across the four quartiles of
CR4 ratio by pooling all the data in the sample years.
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Figure 8. BUNCHING VIA TURNOVER MISREPORTING
A: Distribution of Direct Input-Cost Ratio
.6
.6
5
.7
.7
5
.8
M
ea
n 
C
os
t/S
al
es
-50 0 50 100
Turnover - VAT Notch (£1,000)
Registered Non-Registered
B: Distribution of Salary-Inclusive Cost Ratio
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Notes: the gure plots separately the average input cost ratio for registered and non-
registered rms with a turnover in the neighbourhood of normalized VAT notch during
2004/05-2009/10. Panel A uses the input cost ratio calculated from FAME and exclude
the salary expenses. Panel B uses the input cost ratio calculated from the corporation
tax records and includes salary expenses in the overall cost.
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Table 1. EFFECTS OF COMPETITION ON VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION AND
BUNCHING
e : 2 5 10 20 50
Panel A: the e¤ect of Competition on the su¢ cient statistic T :
Good Y zero-rated (J = 0):
 = 0:1 0.98 1.17 1.65 3.55 39.53
 = 0:5 0.82 0.76 0.78 1.31 13.77
 = 0:9 0.76 0.58 0.40 0.29 2.01
Good Y taxed (J = 1):
 = 0:1 0.95 1.00 0.92 0.47 0.02
 = 0:5 0.80 0.65 0.43 0.16 0.01
 = 0:9 0.76 0.57 0.34 0.13 0.01
Panel B: the e¤ect of Competition on bunching s=s:
Good Y zero-rated (J = 0):
 = 0:1 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 = 0:5 0.74 1.32 1.30 0.00 0.00
 = 0:9 0.95 2.59 5.88 10.17 0.00
Good Y taxed (J = 1):
 = 0:1 0.27 0.00 0.58 4.66 212.75
 = 0:5 0.80 2.02 5.25 23.31 302.75
 = 0:9 0.97 2.75 7.43 32.63 302.75
Notes: Panel A shows how the value of the su¢ cient statistic T
changes with respect to the values of e and , when good Y is zero-
rated (J = 0 in the upper panel) and taxed (J = 1 in the lower panel),
respectively. Panel B shows how the extent of bunching changes with
respect to the level of competition, when good Y is zero-rated (upper
panel) and taxed (lower panel), respectively.
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Table 4. SHARE OF FIRMS THAT VOLUNTARILY REGISTERED FOR VAT (%)
Input Cost Ratio Quartile
B2C Sales Ratio Quartile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 47.05 47.52 45.99 46.98
Q2 56.35 51.80 52.01 55.43
Q3 24.11 29.01 32.87 36.70
Q4 32.93 34.28 36.04 46.77
Notes: this table shows the share of voluntarily registered rms at di¤erent quartiles of
B2C sales and input cost ratio. The share of voluntarily registered rms is calculated as
the number of rms that are voluntarily registered for VAT relative to the total number of
rms at each given quartile of B2C sales ratio and input cost ratio. Each column depicts
the share of rms that are voluntarily registered for VAT at di¤erent quartiles of B2C
sales ratio at a given input cost ratio quartile. Each row depicts the share of rms that
are voluntarily registered for VAT at di¤erent quartiles of input cost ratio at a given B2C
sales ratio quartile.
Table 5. DETERMINANTS OF VAT VOLUNTARY REGISTERATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share of B2C Sales -0.137*** -0.146*** 0.004 0.004 -0.038**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016)
Input Cost Ratio 0.023*** 0.047*** 0.060** 0.069*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
CR4 Ratio -0.068*** -0.050*** 0.002 0.002 -0.010*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Firm FE N N N N Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm-level Controls N N N N N Y Y
R2 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.004
N 478973 478973 473998 473,998 473,998 473,998 53,407
Notes: this table presents estimation results from the binary choice model of VAT registration
based on equation (25). The dependent variable is the binary indicator of VAT registration status
that takes on the value 1 if a rm is voluntarily registered for VAT and zero otherwise. Columns
(1)-(4) present results from the linear probability model and columns (5)-(8) present results from
the xed-e¤ects logit model. Additional rm-level controls include trading prots and company
age. *,**,*** denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors presented in
columns (1)-(4) are clustered at rm level.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, assume only B2C sales i.e.  = 1: in this case, the rm
chooses pC ; pB to maximize (10) subject to (11),(12). This is easily solved to give price as
a mark-up over cost i.e. pC = eCeC 1c(I; a) and thus prot for non-registered and registered
rms respectively is
(0; a) = BC(c(0; a))
1 eC ; (1; a) = BC(c(1; a))1 eC
1
(1 + t)eC
(A.1)
where BC = AC

eC 1
eC
eC
1
eC 1 : So, we only need show that (0; a) > (1; a): But, from
(A.1), (8), this holds i¤
c(0; a)
c(1; a)
1 eC
=
 
!(1 + t)1  + (1  !)(1 eC)=(1 ) > 1
(1 + t)eC
Now note that as eC > 1; 
!(1 + t)1  + (1  !)(1 eC)=(1 )  (1 + t)1 eC > (1 + t) eC
as required.
Next, assume only B2B sales i.e.  = 0: Then, it is easily checked prot is (p  
c(I; a))ABp
 eB : So, here, the argument is even simpler; cost is decreasing, and therefore
prot is increasing, if I = 1: 
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) If registered, the rm chooses pC ; pB to maximize (10) subject
to (11),(12) when I = 1. This is easily solved to give prices as a mark-up over cost i.e.
pC =
eC
eC 1c(I; a); pB(a) =
eB
eB 1c(I; a), and consequently, maximized prot of
(1; a) = (BC(1 + t)
 eCc(1; a)1 eC + (1  )BBc(1; a)1 eB) (A.2)
where as before, BC = AC

eC 1
eC
eC
1
eC 1 ; and also BB = AB

eB 1
eB
eB
1
eB 1 .
Next, if not registered, the rm chooses pC ; pB to maximize (10) subject to (11),(12) when
I = 0; subject also to the constraint pCx + pBy  s that the total value of sales is below
the threshold. Now consider voluntary registration. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for
this is that prot with registration is greater than prot without, ignoring the constraint
that sales be below the threshold. We will assume that a rm will register if indi¤erent, to
break the tie. Following the case for the registered rm, we can show that the prot of an
unregistered rm, ignoring the constraint that sales be below the threshold is
(0; a) = (BCc(0; a)
1 eC + (1  )BBc(0; a)1 eB) (A.3)
Then, the voluntary registration condition is (1; a)  (0; a): After some simple rearrange-
ment, using (A.2),(A.3), this reduces to (16).
(b) We only need show that the RHS of (16) is increasing in  and decreasing in !: The
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statement for  is obvious by inspection. For !; note rst that 1+c  (!(1 + t)1  + 1  !)1=(1 )
is increasing in !: So, both (1 + c)
1 eC ; (1 + c)
1 eB are decreasing in ! as eC ; eB >
1: Finally, note that as c > 0; eB > 1; 1   (1 + c)1 eB > 0: So, the RHS of (16) T is
decreasing in ! as required.
(b) If eB = eC = e; and using AC = 1; (16) rearranges to
(1 + t) e + (1  )AB
+ (1  )AB (1 + d)
e 1 > 1 (A.4)
But then
(1 + t) e + (1  )AB
+ (1  )AB = 1 
(1  (1 + t) e)
+ (1  )AB = 1 d (A.5)
Combining (A.4),(A.5) gives (17).
(c) Note that lime!1
 
1  1
e
e
= 1= exp ' 0:37; and c > 0; so if J = 0; it is clear that
as e!1; the LHS of (A.4) tends to innity, so it always holds for e high enough. On the
other hand, if J = 1; (A.4) becomes
+ (1  )   e 1
e
e
(1 + t)e + (1  )   e 1
e
e (1 + c)e 1 > 1
which behaves for e large, like

(!(1+t)1 +1 !)1=(1 )
1+t
e
: But the number in the bracket is
strictly less than 1 + t; independently of e; so in this case, T ! 0 as e!1: 
Proof of Proposition 3. The indi¤erence condition that determines a + a is (20). To
use this condition, we proceed as follows. To lighten notation, and using eC = eB = e; dene
A0 = + (1  )AB; A1 = (1 + t) e + (1  )AB
First, from (A.2), and using the restriction that eC = eB = e; a rm that registers has
maximized prot:
(1; a) = A1

e
1  e
 e
ae 1
1  e (A.6)
Next, the prot from being just at the VAT threshold for an a type when constrained is
(0; a) = s   1 + c
a
s
p
(A.7)
But solving for p from the constraint A0p1 e = s, we get p =

s
A0
 1=(e 1)
: Substituting
this back into (A.7), and using a = a + a; we get
(0; a + a) = s   1 + c
A
1=(e 1)
0 (a
 + a)
(s)e=(e 1) (A.8)
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Also combining (21) and (A.8), we get:
(0; a + a) = s   1 + c
A
1=(e 1)
0 (a
 + a)
(s)e=(e 1) (A.9)
= s   (s)e=(e 1)

e  1
e

(s + s)1=(1 e)
Now using (21) in (A.6), we get:
(1; a + a) = A1

e
1  e
 e
1
1  e(a
 + a)e 1 (A.10)
=
A1
A0

e
1  e
 e
1
1  e

e (1 + c)
e  1
e 1
(s + s)
=
T
e
(s + s)
So, using (A.10),(A.9), the indi¤erence condition (1; a + a) = 0(0; a + a) becomes
s   (s)e=(e 1)

e  1
e

(s + s)1=(1 e)   T
e
(s + s) = 0 (A.11)
After some simplication of (A.11) (divide through by s; then 1 + s

s ; and multiply by e)
we get (22) as required. 
Proof of Proposition 4. First, (22) can be rewritten as
f(x; e)  T (; !; e)= 0; f(x)  ex  (e  1)xe=(e 1); x = 1
(1 + s=s)
(A.12)
So, from (A.12):
dx
d
=
T
fx
;
dx
d!
=
T!
fx
;
dx
de
=
Te   fe
fx
(A.13)
Moreover, note that
fx = e(1  x1=(e 1)) > 0 (A.14)
because x < 1; and e > 1; so x1=(e 1) < 1: Also, we know that T < 0; T! > 0 and so from
(A.13), (A.14), we conclude that dx
d
< 0; dx
d!
> 0: As x is an inverse measure of bunching, it
follows that as  increases, s rises, and ! rises, s falls. 
The Value-Added of A Registered Small Firm. If  = 0; a rm uses !
a
units of the
input per unit of output. So, the value added of a registered "small" rm is the value of
output minus the value of inputs used i.e.;
V A = pCx+ pBy   !
a
(x+ y)
Now assuming A1 and eC = eB; and the mark-up expressions for prices, i.e. pC = pB = p =
47
e
e 1
1
a
; the rms value-added is
V A =
1
a

e
e  1   !

(x+ y)
_ (1 + t) e + (1  )

e  1
e
e
(1 + J:t) e
So, if J = 1; the elasticity of V A with respect to 1 + t is e; as claimed.
Calibration of !. The average share of costs that is non-labour is
ICR =
!(1 + t)
!(1 + t) + 1  !
where  the fraction of overall sales that are by registered rms. Now  = 0:74; and
ICR = 0:496; and t = 0:175; so
0:496 =
1:123!
1:123! + 1  !
which implies ! = 0:419:
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B Not-For-Publication Appendix
General Proof that Voluntary Registration is not Possible with Only B2C Sales.
Consider a rm facing a residual demand function from nal consumers of x(q); where q is
the consumer price. This covers both the cases of monopoly, where x(:) is also the actual
demand curve, and monopolistic competition, where x(:) is demand for that rms product,
taking the prices of all other rms as xed. Assume all sales are to nal consumers i.e. B2C.
If a rm is registered for VAT, prot is then
R(p) = px(p(1 + t))  c(x(p(1 + t)); w; r)
where p is the producer price, and c(x; w; r) is the cost function given output x; and prices
of labour and the intermediate input w; r. This is completely general cost function that
includes the constant returns CES cost function in the paper as a special case. If the rm is
not registered for VAT, prot is
N(p) = px(p)  c(x(p); w; r(1 + t))
Then, we have
R = max
p
fpx(p(1 + t))  c(x(p(1 + t)); w; r)g
= max
q

q
1 + t
x(q)  c(x(q); w; r)

=
1
1 + t
max
q
fqx(q)  (1 + t) c(x(q); w; r)g
< max
q
f(q   c(x(q); w; r(1 + t)))g
= N
So, with only B2C sales, no rm would every wish to register voluntarily.
The Competitive Economy. here, we present a competitive variant of the model and show
(i) that without segmented markets i.e. di¤erent markets for B2B and B2C transactions,
the equilibrium is trivial, with all rms registering for VAT; (ii) with segmented markets,
there is generically complete sorting, with registered (non-registered) rms only selling B2B
(resp. B2C). Moreover, in the second case, the equilibrium actually has a more complex
structure,being dened by three equations, than in the monopolistic case, which makes
generating empirical predictions more di¢ cult.
Consider a "competitive" version of the model in the paper, where the small rms sell
a homogenous product, with the model unchanged in all other respects. In particular, the
small rms face xed prices pB; pC in the B2B and B2C markets respectively. Moreover, B2B
and B2C demand for the product of the small rms is now given by the perfect competition
analogues of (4) and (l3) i.e.  (pC)
  ; (1   )


1 
 
(pB)
  : So, the revenue per unit
sold by registered and non-registered rms is as in the Table below:
Table B1: Revenue Per Unit
1
registered rms non-registered rms
B2C pC
1+t
pC
B2B pB pB
This is because a registered rm perceives perfectly elastic demand at consumer price
pC in the B2C market, and so must bear all the burden of output VAT. The next steps
to specify rmscost and prot. With perfect competition, rms cost function need to be
strictly convex in order for rm scale to be well-dened. Without much loss of generality, and
for easy comparison to the main model in the paper, we assume that the rm production
functions are CES and homogeneous of degree 1=;  > 1; so the rm cost function is
c(I(a); a)y; where c(I(a); a) is dened in (8).
Consider rst the case where markets are not segmented; then arbitrage by buyers implies
pC = pB = p: But then if a rm registers, by Table A1, it will prefer to sell B2B, and can
thus get maximum prot
R(a) = max
y

py   c(1; a)y	
If a rm does not register, it is indi¤erent to whom it sells, and makes prot
N(a) = max
y

py   c(0; a)y s.t. py  s	
where as in the main paper, s is the VAT threshold. So, clearly, as c(0; a) > c(1; a); all
rms will wish to register, as claimed. [It is not clear that this is an equilibrium, however,
as nal consumers will receive no supply, and they are willing to pay for supply].
If markets are segmented, then (ignoring non-generic cases) for an equilibrium to exist,
by the above table the two prices must satisfy:
pC
1 + t
< pB < pC (B.1)
For any other price conguration, both types of rms would not wish to supply either
nal consumers or businesses, and that could not be an equilibrium, because from iso-elastic
demand, the buyer without supply would be willing to pay an arbitrarily high price for the
good. Note that for this price conguration, there is complete sorting i.e.registered rms
only sell B2B, and non-registered rms only sell B2C41.
But then, using (B.1), the prots to registering and not are
R(a) = max
y

pBy   c(1; a)y
	
; N(a) = max
y

pCy   c(0; a)y s.t. pCy  s
	
If rms di¤er in the input cost ratio, there may be both voluntary registration and bunching,
as in the main model. To see this, rst note that a rm of type a will register voluntarily
41In can be shown that in the model of the main paper, there is partial sorting i.e. registered rms sell
relatively more B2B than non-registered rms do, and that if eC = eB = e; this sorting e¤ect is stronger, the
higher is e i.e. the more competitive is the market for the di¤erentiated good. Moreover, in the competitive
limit as e!1, there is complete sorting: A proof of this available on request.
2
i¤ R(a) is greater than the payo¤ from not registering, ignoring the constraint pCy  s:
After performing the maximisations, the condition reduces to
(pB)
=( 1)(c(1; a)) 1=( 1)  (pC)=( 1)(c(0; a)) 1=( 1)
and nally to a condition independent of a;
pB
pC


c(1; a)
c(0; a)
1=
(B.2)
This condition says that voluntary registration will occur for those rms where the loss of
revenue from a lower price, measured inversely by pB=pC ; is less than the cost gain from
being registered, measured inversely by c(1; a)=c(0; a). On the face it it, this is a simpler
condition than (17) in the paper. In particular, it is clear that conditional on pB
pC
; the higher
the input cost ratio, the more likely this is to be satised. However, recall that pB; pC are
endogenous and remain to be determined.
Assume now that there are some rms with an input -cost ratio such that (B.2) is not
satised. Then, by an argument as in the main paper, some of these rms will bunch i.e.
there will be a critical a^ such that R(a^) = N(a^); so that only rms above a^ will register: This
can be manipulated into a condition similar to (22). Finally, the two prices are determined
in equilibrium by the two conditions
 (pC)
  =
a^Z
a
yN(pC ; a)da; (1  )


1  
 
((1 + Jt)pB)
  =
aZ
a^
yR(pB; a)da (B.3)
where the supply functions are dened as;
yR(pB; a) = arg max
y

pBy   c(1; a)y
	
yN(pC ; a) = arg max
y

pCy   c(0; a)y s.t. pCy  s
	
So, in equilibrium, a^ and the prices (pB; pC) are determined by three simultaneous conditions
R(a^) = N(a^); and (B.3). The e¤ects of changes in ! and  on voluntary registration and
bunching could no doubt be calculated, but this may be a complex exercise.
Derivation of the Bunching Equation with Evasion. The proof follows the proof of
Proposition 4 in the paper, with the following changes. First, we dene A0; A1 as
A0 = (1  ) + (1  )AB; A1 = ((1 + (1  )t) e + (1  )AB)
As in (A.2) in the paper, any rm that registers has maximized prot:
(1; a) = A1

e
1  e
 e
ae 1
1  e (B.4)
3
Next, the payo¤ from being on the VAT threshold for an a type when constrained is now
(0; a) = (s + px)  1 + c
a
(s + px)
p
(B.5)
This is because the rm can actually produce and sell s + px with a threshold s because
sales px are "cash" and thus not observable by the tax authority. Solving for p from the
denition that non-concealed sales must be equal to s i.e. ((1  )+ (1  )AB)p1 e = s;
we get:
p =

s
(1  )+ (1  )AB
 1=(e 1)
Combining this with the fact that x = p1 e; we get
s + px = s
+ (1  )AB
(1  )+ (1  )AB  s

Substituting this back into (B.5), and setting a = a + a; we get
(0; a + a) = 
 
s   1 + c
A
1=(e 1)
0 (a
 + a)
(s)e=(e 1)
!
(B.6)
Also observed non-cash sales map into type by
s + s = A0

e (1 + c)
e  1
1 e
(a + a)e 1; A0 = (1  ) + (1  )AB (B.7)
Combining (B.7) and (B.6), we get:
(0; a + a) = 
 
s   1 + c
A
1=(e 1)
0 (a
 + a)
(s)e=(e 1)
!
(B.8)
= 
 
s   (1 + c) (s
)e=(e 1)
A
1=(e 1)
0
(A0)
1=(e 1)

e  1
ec0

(s + s)1=(1 e)
!
= 

s   (s)e=(e 1)

e  1
e

(s + s)1=(1 e)

4
Now using (B.7) in (B.4), we get:
(1; a + a) = A1

e
1  e
 e
1
1  e(a
 + a)e 1 (B.9)
=
A1
A0

e
1  e
 e
1
1  e

ec0
e  1
e 1
(s + s)
=
A1(1 + c)
e 1
eA0
(s + s)
= T ()
s + s
e
So, using (B.8),(B.9), the indi¤erence condition (1; a + a) = 0(0; a + a) becomes
s   (s)e=(e 1)

e  1
e

(s + s)1=(1 e)   T ()
e
(s + s) = 0 (B.10)
After some simplication of (B.10) (divide through by s; then 1 + s

s ; and multiply by e)
we get (22) in the paper with the tax term T ()

= T () +(1 )AB
(1 )+(1 )AB as required. 
C Supplementary Tables
5
Table C.1. TRANSITION MATRIX OF VAT REGISTRATION STATUS
Rt = 1 Rt = 1 Rt = 0 Rt = 0
IDt = 1 IDt = 0 IRt = 1 IRt = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t = 1
R0 = 1; ID0 = 1 89.34% 10.61% 0.03% 0.02%
R0 = 1; ID0 = 0 20.50% 79.30% 0.01% 0.19%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 1 4.18% 1.14% 78.46% 16.22%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 0 1.45% 1.59% 6.15% 90.80%
t = 2
R0 = 1; ID0 = 1 85.35% 14.45% 0.07% 0.12%
R0 = 1; ID0 = 0 25.49% 73.55% 0.03% 0.93%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 1 6.30% 1.63% 71.25% 20.82%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 0 3.23% 2.71% 7.22% 86.83%
t = 3
R0 = 1; ID0 = 1 81.30% 18.03% 0.13% 0.54%
R0 = 1; ID0 = 0 26.71% 71.35% 0.07% 1.88%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 1 8.03% 2.19% 65.21% 24.58%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 0 4.85% 4.02% 6.90% 84.23%
t = 4
R0 = 1; ID0 = 1 76.14% 21.71% 0.55% 1.60%
R0 = 1; ID0 = 0 26.34% 68.85% 0.32% 4.48%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 1 7.67% 3.13% 59.76% 29.44%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 0 5.65% 4.82% 5.99% 83.55%
t = 5
R0 = 1; ID0 = 1 67.61% 29.57% 0.32% 2.50%
R0 = 1; ID0 = 0 22.50% 72.21% 0.18% 5.11%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 1 7.34% 4.60% 52.71% 35.35%
R0 = 0; IR0 = 0 5.37% 6.14% 5.34% 83.15%
Notes: this table shows in each cell the probability of changing
from registration status in year t to year t+ 1.
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